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Introduction

21
The fast pace of growth of health care expenditure relative to GDP growth that has been ex-
22
perienced by most developed countries, especially prior to the global economic crisis (OECD, 23 2013), has led regulators to look for innovative solutions to deal with the increasing demands 24 on health care budgets. With a general consensus that technological innovation plays a central 25 role in driving increased costs (Weisbrod, 1991) , much effort has been targeted towards the pro-26 cess by which new health technologies are adopted and priced. The aim has been to reduce two 27 types of risk faced by regulators: paying for technologies that are not 'good value for money' 28 and adopting technologies whose effectiveness, once deployed, is lower than the efficacy that 
31
Including an assessment of a new health technology's cost-effectiveness has been a com- 
51
The tension between the objective of curbing expenditure on health technologies that are al-52 ready available in the market and the need to incentivise investment in R&D that will lead to 53 future innovations is known as the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. However, 54 equity concerns may also be relevant. For a regulatory framework which does not explicitly 55 account for the size of the population to be treated, incentives to invest in R&D are weaker for 56 technologies targeting comparatively rare diseases ('orphan diseases'). One reason why these 57 are comparatively unattractive areas for R&D investment is that predicted sales revenue is pro-58 portional to the size of the population to treat, while R&D expenses are largely independent of 59 it (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Dimitri, 2012) . Moreover, for rare diseases, meeting the require-60 ments set by authorities regulating market access may be more costly, and require a longer period 61 for experimentation, due to the availability of a smaller population from which to obtain a sam-62 ple. Hence, disincentives for research into rare diseases may be found at both commercialisation, regulatory framework may influence a health technology provider's incentive to invest in projects 106 which are deemed by the provider to be 'marginal', that is, ones for which the expected profit is 107 close to zero, by looking at the incentive to research treatments for rare diseases. In particular, we 108 characterise the minimum size of a population to treat such that the firm is incentivised to invest 109 in the development of a new drug. In an application using published data from trials of a new 110 treatment for cystic fibrosis, defined as a rare disease by the Orphanet register of rare diseases 111 (Orphanet, 2014), we show how parameters and regulatory policies in both periods, such as the 112 level of the Type I error that characterises the regulatory authority's decision and the uncertainty 113 surrounding the level of the payer's maximum willingness to pay for one effectiveness unit, can 114 affect the incentives to invest.
115
Section 2 presents a brief summary of the literature. Section 3 presents the model. Sections 
Background
124
The work builds on a number of statistical and economic approaches to Phase III trial design, levels of R&D effort and show that, the greater is the market size, the more profitable it is to sup-138 ply the drug and so the greater will be the research effort required to gain market-leader position. (assumed unknown to all agents). For simplicity we assume that the trial is placebo-controlled, 160 an assumption which may be justified when there exists no approved treatment, or when the new 161 treatment is given as an add-on to existing standard treatment. The HTP has a prior distribution 162 on µ, defined by a normal random variable with mean µ 0 and variance σ 2 0 .
163
It is assumed that the n responses observed in the trial are used to calculate the sample mean 164 X, an unbiased and consistent estimator of µ:
where σ is assumed known to all agents. We use the convention that upper case denotes a random 166 variable (e.g., at the start of the planning horizon, X is a random variable) and lower case denotes 167 its realisation (e.g., once the trial has concluded, x denotes the realisation of X).
168
The HTP knows that, if a clinical trial is commissioned, upon its completion, a Regulatory incremental effectiveness, x, exceeds a critical value, x crit (n) > 0, defined as:
where z α is the standard normal Z-value corresponding to the one-sided significance level, α.
202
If this condition is not satisfied, the treatment is rejected by the RA and is not taken forward to Section 5 we relax this assumption using a calibrated application.
233
The HCI will adopt the new drug with probability 1 − F W ( p / x ; m, s ), which may be inter- profit function is:
As already noted, the HTP's problem is solved recursively. Firstly, it establishes an optimal 
245
In order to derive the main theoretical results of Section 4, it is necessary to state a number 246 of assumptions concerning the probability distribution F W . These are dealt with in Section 3.4.
247
The reader wishing to skip these more technical aspects and the formal solution to the model 248 may move directly to the application in Section 5. 
A2 (Increasing hazard function).
259
The hazard function of T , r T (t) = f T (t)/(1 − F T (t)), is an increasing function for t ∈ R.
260
Assumption A1 permits us uniquely to define any member of the family describing maximum 261 WTP in terms of the pair (m, s), separating the location and scale properties from the shape of the 262 distribution, which is determined by F T . It is required to define the existence of an optimal price, 263 as well as to obtain comparative statics results. As shown in Figure 1 , the assumption implies that 264 an increase in s rotates F W around the location parameter m such that F W increases/decreases 265 according to whether w is less than/greater than m. That is:
Intuitively, an increase in s implies that the density is moved from the centre of the distribution 
The optimal ICER is the value v = v * (m, s) which solves the first order necessary condition:
or, equivalently,
which is a simplified version of the standard monopolist's inverse elasticity rule for a single 296 product in the presence of zero marginal production cost (Tirole, 1988) . By Assumption A1, an but not the optimal choice of the ICER. This provides two simple, but important, expressions for 309 optimal price and profits in terms of the optimal ICER, v * , which are required to solve the Stage 310 0 problem. They show that the optimal price is independent of the population size, while being 311 strictly increasing in the effect size, x:
The following comparative statics expressions for optimal price (ICER) and profit with respect 313 to N, x and m are formally derived in Appendix A.1:
The results for N and x have been discussed above. prices would be reduced and optimal expected profits increased. The reason is that, with less 366 uncertainty, it is optimal for HTPs to propose lower prices, but the increase in the probability of 367 acceptance that this would imply is such that expected profits would be higher. Figure 4 (a) of the 368 application shows the three regions of s for which these various effects may be observed.
369
As the uncertainty surrounding the value of the HCI's maximum willingness to pay decreases 
subject to n ≥ n min .
P is the probability that the realisation of x from the trial exceeds the RA's lower acceptance 397 threshold, x crit (n). Since the prior predictive distribution for X is normal with mean µ 0 and
where Φ denotes the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
400
Changing the sample size, n, has two effects on expected rewards: firstly, increasing n re-
401
duces the standard deviation of the predictive distribution, σ p ; secondly, increasing n lowers the 402 acceptance threshold, x crit . As a result, changes in n change both the conditional expected value
403
of X and the conditional probability, P, in Eq. (10).
404
For an interior solution, n * > n min and ∂Γ 0 (·)/∂n = 0, implying that the following condition 405 holds:
The left hand side of this expression is the marginal benefit (MB) of sampling at Stage 0, ac- 
elasticities that appear in parentheses). These elasticities capture the two aforementioned effects 414 of n on the conditional expectation and the probability of acceptance, respectively.
415
The per-study-subject expected reward will be strictly positive because x crit (n min ) can never 416 be less than zero. Hence the sign of the marginal benefit function is determined by the signs and 417 sizes of the two elasticities. Since both E[ X | X > x crit (n) ] > 0 and P(x > x crit (n)) > 0, the 418 sign of each elasticity depends solely on the sign of the partial derivative that each contains. In 419 general, marginal benefit may be an increasing, or decreasing, function of n. There will exist a 420 unique optimal value of n * > n min if there is a single point where Eq. (12) is satisfied and the 421 marginal benefit function is falling. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3 . Using the same methods of proof, it is possible to derive comparative static results for optimal 440 profits with respect to N and m under the assumptions of Proposition 3(a) which lead to Eq. (13):
Further, under the assumptions of Proposition 3(a) and (b) which lead to Eq. (14), it is possible 442 to derive the comparative static results for optimal sample size with respect to N and m: Two policy implications follow from these results. First, an increase in m, the expected value
444
of maximum WTP, not only increases the expected profit of the project, but also the optimal 445 sample size of the trial. Second, since the optimal sample size, n * , is an increasing function of 446 the population size, N, it will be optimal to select lower sample sizes for rare diseases and there
447
will exist a lower bound on population size below which no trial will be optimal. This matter is 448 considered next, in the context of the optimal investment decision. 
Optimal investment decision
450
The dynamic efficiency implications of the regulatory framework that were discussed in Section for the optimal sample size, the condition for the optimal investment decision is straightforward.
454
The project will be started if and only if Γ * 0 ( · ) > 0. treatment is non-negative:
This equation defines a 'marginal project' from the perspective of the market size for the drug 459 and is required for some of the analysis of the incentives to invest in trials for rare diseases that 460 is presented in Section 5. 
471
The economic intuition for these results has been stated in the paragraphs immediately fol-472 lowing Proposition 2. In this section, we provide a calibrated application of the theoretical model,
473
which we believe is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it illustrates the U-shaped na-
474
ture of the optimal price, profit and sample size functions that were described in Propositions 
482
For the model to be operationalised, a functional form for F W , the CDF of the HCI's maxi-483 mum WTP, must be specified. We use the logistic distribution, which satisfies all of the assump- 
whereθ ≡ ( N, x, m, s, I 1 , b for a sub-group of cystic fibrosis patients (described below), the U.S. FDA denied marketing and 'high' uncertainty, within which the responses of price and profits to increases in s differ:
531
• The 'low uncertainty' range is defined as the region to the left of the minimum point on 532 2 When introducing fixed and variable production costs, the optimal price is no longer independent of N but decreasing in it. The derivation ofŝ from Proposition 1, needs to be adjusted as follows:ŝ = (m − c p (N )/x)r T (0). Moreover, the simple result describing the position ofŝ relative tos following Proposition 2 no longer holds, and the optimal ICER is no longer independent of x. This, in turn, implies that optimal Stage 1 profit is no longer linear in x, which complicates the theoretical analysis of the optimal Stage 0 policy. Nevertheless, given the parameter values that we choose, the U-shaped behaviour of Γ * 0 and n * with respect to s that was derived for the case c p (N ) = 0 is still observed. Table 1 : Parameter values and sources used for the application. the optimal ICER function,s = £6,604/QALY. As s −→ 0, the optimal ICER tends to 533 the expected value of maximum WTP for one effectiveness unit (m = £39,417/QALY).
534
In this region, both optimal price and optimal expected Stage 1 profits are decreasing in 535 uncertainty s.
536
• The 'high uncertainty' range is defined as the region to the right ofŝ = £19,382/QALY, 
547
Although a full welfare analysis is beyond the scope of the present work, the results obtained 
558
With the parameter values of our application, and assuming that m is equal to the true value 559 of the HCI's maximum WTP, the optimal sample size for this special case is n * = 135, and 
The role of market size
565
The results of Section 4 showed that the optimal price setting policy is independent of the size meaning that, for a comparatively rare disease, it is optimal to propose a higher price. This, in 570 turn, leads to a lower probability of acceptance and lower expected profits per patient. 
578
From the policy perspective, the main concern about orphan diseases is the lack of incentives 579 for the firm to undertake R&D projects that could benefit those patients. In Section 4.2.2 we 580 defined N min as the minimum market size such that the HTP would find it profitable to start the 581 project. Figure 5(b) shows that, for the set of parameters used in the calibration, N min is between 582 5,000 and 10,000.
583
The analysis presented so far shows that some of the parameters relevant in Stage 1 and which 584 might be, to some extent, under the control of the HCI may be crucial in providing incentives 585 to invest in R&D. We conclude the discussion of our application with an attempt to investigate 586 quantitatively the role of two parameters characterising Stage 0: α and n min . Figure 6 shows N min 587 3 The economic intuition for the effect of N on p * is straightforward. Consider two drugs with very different population sizes, but common fixed costs of production I 1 > 0. For both drugs, an increase in p increases expected revenues if the technology is eventually adopted, but also reduces the probability of adoption. Absent fixed investment costs, both terms would be proportional to N and the marginal condition would not be affected. But with I 1 > 0, what is left to the firm producing the drug for a less common disease is less. Therefore, the marginal cost due to the reduction in the probability of adoption is less. This leads to a higher value of the optimal price. 4 Figure 5(b) shows profits per patient, and not total profits, for the sake of clarity. Note that the maximisation problem is unaffected. given value of α, N min is non-decreasing in n min because, when the latter is a binding constraint,
593
an increase means that a larger market is required to make non-negative profits. The flat parts of 594 the curves correspond to regions where n * > n min . Overall, the figure suggests that any policy 595 consideration on the impact of statistical requirements on the incentive to invest in R&D should 596 take both of these parameters into account. In quantitative terms, for the set of parameters used, 597 the impact of increasing α from 2.5% to 20% is to almost halve the value of N min when n min is 598 very small. 
676
(see Section 2) could be used to model such a relationship.
677
Although exogenous in our model, the HTP's beliefs about the HCI's maximum WTP could 678 be modelled as endogenous, so that the HTP learns about the true value of the maximum WTP 679 by observing the HCI's decisions and updating beliefs.
680
Although it is acknowledged that the drug discovery and development process extends well 681 beyond the remit of this paper (Pennings and Sereno, 2011), the part of the process that we 682 consider is crucial because of the size of its costs, which are estimated to be around 50% of The 95% confidence interval reported by Bilton et al. is used to obtain an estimate of σ, the
